Transfer Of Power Agreement 1947 Pdf

As I have said before, the two principles on which the Cripps mission came together, namely the agreement and a period of Dominion status with total freedom of choice, seem to be fulfilled, as I can see in the copy of the White Paper which is now in the polling station and which I received with the kind permission of the Prime Minister an hour ago. 34 Mountbatten, in its personal report No. 5 of May 1, 1947, referred to a “new problem” posed by Jinnah`s statement that the question of Pakistan and the Commonwealth is not whether or not it seeks admission, but whether or not it can be deported without their consent. He told Jinnah that Britain would be in a “pretty impossible position” if Pakistan were in the Commonwealth and India did not break out and a war broke out between them. At the same time, he noted that Congress was involved in a “violent discussion” about props and was “very frightened”; they should “have no idea what the attitude of the HMG is” (L/P-J/ 10/79). It was a bit dishonest on Mountbatten`s side to call Jinnah`s assertion a “problem.” It was rather a trait in his hand with regard to the encouragement of the Congress on the Commonwealth: “I am working on a very delicate maneuver to allow Congress to allow Congress to return to the Commonwealth in one way or another, which could bear fruit, but it is too delicate to write about it at this time. Ismay can give you the last form. (Viceroy of the Secretary of State, May 1 and 2, R/3/1/136) See also Moore, `Disengagement from India`. The Chiefs of Staff took great account of Pakistan`s impact in the interior and India outside the Commonwealth. They concluded that, if Pakistan were the only one interested in the existence of the European Union, the best outcome would be, but that it would have to be accepted because of its strategic importance. See in particular JP (47) 55 of May 9, 1947, an auxiliary brief from the Joint Planning Staff and the discussion at the 62nd session of the C.O.S. on May 12, both in L/PO/428.

It has nothing to do with the June congressional attempt to convince HMG that there would be no differentiation in relations between the UK and India. See z.B. Kripalani`s letter of June 2, 1947 (L/P-J/10/81). Gandhi also made a special plea on this point, reported in London on June 12, 1947. On June 19, Turnbull said a thorough review was needed before HMG issued such assurances. If Congress was not cooperative, why would Pakistan “do nothing better”? It is time that we can start looking at British interests on their merits and “it turns out that we will get much better agreements with Hindustan by leaving open the possibility that if Hindustan does not give us good agreements with Pakistan, we will reach more favourable agreements” (L/P/10/99). On 26 June, the Indian Committee approved a reply to the Viceroy stating that no guarantee could be given, as this would amount to “throwing our strongest negotiating point with Congress”. Unless they were concerned that the UK has better relations with Pakistan (and, in fact, it was added, with non-member countries!) Congress could indeed “reject any concrete agreement with us on defence and other issues.” For this reason, the Vice-King was advised to maintain the hope of “making such good and close agreements with the two new states” (L/P/10/81).

(The excerpts, self-explanatory, shed light on the mood of the day, August 15, 1947, as he saw, and among the elite classes, and shows the slave way of thinking cultivated by Congress etc.